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SUMMARY 
 
Section 187(2)(b) of the Labour Relations Act sets out certain justifications for what may 
seem to be unfair discrimination in the workplace.  The purpose of this note is to discuss the 
provisions of Age Discrimination, with specific focus on the rights of older employees, who 
have reached, what some might term, the ‘normal or agreed retirement age’.  In the discuss 
which follows reference will be made to the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa1 in 
order to investigate the provisions of our new democratic era, and what is said therein about 
discrimination, and age discrimination in particular.  In our new Constitutional dispensation 
there have also been circumstances where certain kinds of discrimination have become 
accepted on society, for example Affirmative Action, and an enquiry into the difference 
between discrimination and differentiation will therefore also be necessary.  The provisions of 
the Employment Equity Act,2 which deal specifically with eliminating unfair discrimination 
in the workplace, and the Labour Relations Act,3
 
 which deals primarily with the rights of 
employees, employers and trade unions, and seeks to harmonize employer-employee relations 
will be discussed wherein specific reference will be made to section 187(2)(b) of the LRA. 
A further discussion will outline the circumstances of what is meant by dismissal in the 
context of age based dismissals, and whether such a dismissal is infact a dismissal and 
whether, within the requirements of the LRA such a dismissal, or termination of employment 
contract, is infact fair.  Furthermore, a comparative perspective of other jurisdictions will give 
a more complete understanding of the issue of age-based dismissals within the current 
context. However, to refer to legislation and foreign decisions alone, while being of important 
reference, is not enough and a enquiry into our own case law will be of significant importance 
to determine a path of direction one can expect when faced with a question of dismissals 
based on mandatory retirement ages, and in particular, a dismissal which has been so executed 
with recourse to section 187(2)(b) of the LRA.  In the various cases the reasoning and 
rationale behind the decision making will shed light on a seemingly unresolved area of labour 
law, and in reading further not only in the judgments but also in various articles, one will see 
that there are many arguments for and against the use of a mandatory retirement age, the most 
important of which will be highlighted. 
                                                 
1  Act 108 of 1996. 
2   Act 55 of 1998. 
3  Act 66 of 1995. 
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CHAPTER 1 
INTRODUCTION 
 
‘Age discrimination is an issue that has received very little attention in our courts. This 
may strike one as strange, given that there are many products and services being offered 
in our society that are limited to people who fall within a certain age group.  The effect of 
this, of course, is that if you are too old then you will simply not be considered, or, as in 
this case, will simply find that your continued employment may come to a drastic end.  I 
have recently had reason to consider the issue of age discrimination in this context but, of 
course, it is prevalent in many aspects of society; and the constitutional inquiry could be 
approached in a similar manner in most cases.  Age discrimination of this kind raises 
some very interesting legal issues (that have been largely avoided in both the literature 
and in the courts) and this note seeks to explore some of these, for example, as to the 
meaning of “normal or agreed’ retirement ages’.4
 
 
As this treatise is primarily focused on discussing the fairness of discriminatory dismissals, it 
will begin by assessing the nature of the right to equality, which will include a discussion on 
what the Constitution provides on the subject of fairness, as well as an enquiry into the 
relevant pieces of legislation which have been enacted to give effect to the Constitution.  As 
will be shown later on in this note, not all forms of discrimination or differentiation is deemed 
to be unfair and in the next part focus will be had on how one would go about assessing the 
difference between unfair discrimination, and the so called ‘fair’ discrimination, and to 
consider for a moment under what circumstances such action will be justified.   
 
Section 187(1)(f) says that if a dismissal is based on one or more of the grounds listed therein, 
will be automatically unfair unless it is justified by section 187(2)(b).  It therefore becomes 
necessary to view the provision in a textual approach, and break down the section word by 
word.  Thereby asking the questions as to what amounts to a dismissal in the circumstances, 
where do we receive the grounds on which section 187(1)(f) includes and how are they 
determined.  In answering these questions reference will be had to various pieces of statute, 
foreign law and of course as a member state of the ILO, international law.  Moreover, an 
enquiry such as this will not be complete until it has sought answers form our courts of law 
and decided cases, which will undoubtedly provide some clarity as to the current position in 
South Africa with regards to the question of mandatory retirement ages.  In closing a brief 
reference must of course be had to the relevant arguments for and against the retention of 
section 187(2)(b), and in particular what this means in a South African context. 
                                                 
4  Hopkins Age Discrimination (September 2006) De Rebus. 
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The world’s population is ageing and people are, generally, living longer and producing fewer 
children.  The result is that the number of older members in society is increasing more rapidly 
than that of their younger counterparts.  According to a recent report issued by the 
International Labour Organization (ILO) the pace of ageing differs between countries and 
regions.  The so-called developing countries still have relatively young populations, while 
industrialized countries have relatively old populations. However, populations in developing 
countries are ageing more rapidly than those in industrialized countries.  It is projected that by 
2050, 33% of people living in industrialized countries will be 60 years of age or over, 
compared to 19% in developing countries.  Those over 60 years in developing countries will 
constitute 80% of the world's elderly population.  Simultaneously, as many older, yet willing 
and productive members of the labour force are compelled to leave employment by virtue of 
employers’ retirement ages, their skills and contributions to the economy are lost.  The focus 
of this treatise is on section 187(2)(b) of the Labour Relations Act 66 of 1995 (LRA), which 
deals with the fairness of dismissals based on an employee's age.5
                                                 
5  Bosch ‘Section 187(2)(b) and the Dismissal of Older Workers - Is the LRA Nuanced Enough?’ (2003) 
ILJ. 
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CHAPTER 2 
THE RIGHT TO EQUALITY IN EMPLOYMENT 
 
2.1 NATURE OF EQUALITY 
 
Employment policies always draw distinctions between employees and groups of employees, 
whether it is with regard to skills, education or even experience, and often do so, on the basis 
of immutable or hard-to-change personal characteristics like disability or even a person’s 
height, as was illustrated in the American case of Dothard v Rawlinson.6  Employment 
opportunities such as promotion, training and career development may depend on 
psychological and/or other assessments, employment benefits may be denied to employees 
on the grounds of age or marital status, and employees who reach a particular age may be 
required to retire. When are these personal characteristics relevant, and when can employers 
legitimately take them into consideration to make employment-related decisions? These are 
the essential questions that equality laws seek to address.  Aristotle7 thought that justice 
requires that people who are equal should be treated equally, and that those who are unequal 
should be treated unequally.  Put another way, people who are similarly situated should be 
treated similarly, and people who are not similarly situated should not be treated alike.8  What 
this formulation raises, of course, is the question of what counts as relevant when determining 
whether people are similarly situated, and what constitutes similar treatment for those who are 
similarly situated.9  Perhaps one way in which this could be done is to see if there are 
legitimate purpose behind treating people differently, in Leonard Dingler Employee 
Representative Council v Leonard Dingler10
 
 while attempting to establish a general defence to 
claims of unequal treatment the court said ‘discrimination is unfair if it is reprehensible in 
terms of society’s prevailing norms.  Whether or not society will tolerate the discrimination 
depends on what the object is of the discrimination and the means used to achieve it.  The 
object must be legitimate and means proportional and rational’.   
                                                 
6  Dothard v Rawlinson 433 US 321 (1977).  
7  Nicomachean Ethics (1980). 
8  Currie and De Waal The Bill of Rights Handbook (2005) 230. 
9  Ibid. 
10  Leonard Dingler Employee Representative Council v Leonard Dingler (Pty) Ltd (1998) 19 ILJ 285 (LC). 
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The right to equality cannot therefore preclude employers from drawing distinctions between 
employees or groups of employees, and from treating them differently, because to do so 
would inevitably cause more damage than harm.  Assume for a moment that the rule of 
equality was strictly applied with no exceptions, and then compare a blind person with a 
person who has perfect sight.  In terms of an approach of equal treatment it wouldn’t take 
very long to imagine situations where the blind person may adversely effected by equal 
treatment, for example reading.  If no provision was made to accommodate blind persons 
with the aid of brail, many if not most would be severely prejudiced in attempting to educate 
themselves.  In other words, not every instance of different treatment in the workplace is 
morally or legally wrong.  The courts have distinguished between acts that they have termed 
'mere differentiation' (different treatment that is legitimate and permissible) and 'unfair 
discrimination' or different treatment that is not legitimate and which is prohibited. Much of 
this note focuses on how the labour courts and legislators have gone about drawing this 
distinction when it is applied to employees who are differentiated on the basis of their ‘age’.  
The Labour Court has held that discrimination occurs when people are not treated as 
individuals, or when characteristics are assigned to people which amount to generalized 
assumptions about people or groups of people.   Article 1 of Council Directive 2000/78/EC of 
The Council of the European Union provides that; ‘Member States may provide that differences 
of treatment on the grounds of age, shall not constitute discrimination if, within the context of 
national law, they are objectively and reasonably justified by a legitimate aim, including 
legitimate employment policy, labour market and vocational training objectives, and if the means 
of achieving that aim are appropriate and necessary’. 
 
2.2 CONSTITUTIONAL DIMENSION 
 
‘The change in the South African Constitutional order in 1994 and again in 1996 entailed the 
laying down the broad parameters against discrimination in society, representing a significant 
departure from the previous dispensation.’11  It goes without saying  then that, in South 
Africa, the Constitution12
                                                 
11  Basson, Christianson, Garbers, Le Roux, Mischke and Strydom Essential Labour Law 4th ed (2005) 201. 
 is the supreme law of the land, and as emulated in section 2  
thereof, all law or conduct that is inconsistent with the provisions of the Constitution is 
invalid.  Section 1 of the Constitution states that the Republic of South Africa is founded on 
the values of ‘human dignity, the achievement of equality and the advancement of rights and 
12  The Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, Act 108 of 1996. 
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freedoms’.  Section 9 thereof gives expression to these values and provides not only that, 
everyone is equal before the law and has the right to equal, protection and benefit of the law, 
but also that equality includes the just and equal enjoyment of all rights and freedoms, and 
has as its primary objective to ensure, as far as possible, the fair and equal treatment of all 
persons within the Republic of South Africa.  Section 9 reads as follows: 
 
‘1. Everyone is equal before the law and has the right to equal protection and benefit of 
the law. 
2. Equality includes the full and equal enjoyment of all rights and freedoms.  To 
promote the achievement of equality, legislative and other measures designed to 
protect or advance persons or categories of persons, disadvantaged by unfair 
discrimination may be taken. 
3. The state may not unfairly discriminate directly or indirectly against anyone one 
more or more grounds, including race, gender, sex, pregnancy, marital status, 
ethnic or social origin, colour, sexual orientation, age, disability, religion, 
conscious belief, culture, language and birth. 
4. No person may unfairly discriminate directly or indirectly against anyone on one or 
more grounds in terms of subsection (3).  National legislation must be enacted to 
prevent or prohibit unfair discrimination. 
5. Discrimination on one or more of the grounds listed in subsection (3) is unfair 
unless it is established that the discrimination is fair.’13
 
 
What is important to remember is that the Constitution does not prohibit differentiation or 
discrimination, what is prohibited is the unequal treatment of people or groups of people that 
has an unfair impact, in other words unfair discrimination.  It is therefore clear that the 
Constitution has envisaged circumstances where people or groups of people may be treated 
unequally or differentiated against.  This is not unique to the South African Constitution; take 
for example the following commentary by Peter Hogg on Canadian law which states that: 
 
‘[t]he criminal Code imposes punishments on persons convicted of criminal offences; no 
similar burdens are placed on the innocent.  Education Acts require children to attend 
school; no similar obligation is imposed on adults.  Manufacturers of food and drugs are 
subject to more stringent regulations than the manufacturers of automobile parts.  The 
income tax Act imposes a higher rate of tax on those with high incomes than on those 
with low incomes.  Indeed every statute or regulation employs classifications of one kind 
or another for the imposition of burdens or the grant of benefits.  Laws never provide the 
same for everyone.’14
 
 
This formulation acknowledges that the concept of equality has two basic dimensions.  The 
first is formal equality, also known as equality in treatment or equality of opportunity, and 
envisages that like must be treated as like, in other words, that all persons must be treated in 
                                                 
13  The Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, Act 108 of 1996. 
14  Constitutional Law of Canada 3rd ed at para 52.6(b). 
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the same manner irrespective of their circumstances.  Provided that everyone has access to the 
same opportunities, any differentiation between them is excused.  Formal equality disregards 
economic and social disparities between individuals and groups, and treats everyone on an 
equal footing. 
 
The second dimension is that of substantive equality, or equality in outcome and ‘is enshrined 
through the adoption of positive measures’,15 and considers the social and economic factors 
of groups and individuals in order to determine the consequences or effects of a specific rule.  
‘It is clear that the Constitution recognises that only a combination of these two mechanisms 
can help us approach genuine equality, which includes the full and equal enjoyment of all 
rights and freedoms.’16  In Minister of Finance v van Heerden17
 
 the Constitutional Court 
explained the relationship between ‘formal’ and ‘substantive’ equality as follows:  
‘A comprehensive understanding of the Constitutions conception of equality requires a 
harmonious reading of the provisions of section 9.  Section 9(1) proclaims that everyone is 
equal before the law and has the right to equal protection and benefit of the law.  On the 
other hand, section 9(3) proscribes unfair discrimination by the State against anyone on 
any ground including [age].  However, section 9(2) provides for the achievement of full 
and equal enjoyment of all rights and freedoms and authorizes legislative and other 
measures designed to protect or advance persons or categories of persons disadvantaged 
by unfair discrimination.  Restitutionary measures … may be taken to promote the 
achievement of equality.  The measures [used to achieve equality] must be designed to 
protect or advance persons disadvantaged by unfair discrimination ...”18
 
 
The court thereafter noted that the use formal equality only had many shortcomings and that 
the use of substantive equality, or equality in outcome should be preferred due to the forward 
looking and constructive methodology which it seeks to promote in South Africa, and said 
that ‘our supreme law says more about equality than do comparable constitutions.  Like other 
constitutions, it confers the right to equal protection and benefit of the law and the right to 
non-discrimination.  But it also imposes a positive duty on all organs of state to protect and 
promote the achievement of equality - a duty which binds the judiciary too’.19
                                                 
15  Basson, Christianson, Garbers, le Roux, Mischke, Strydom Essential Labour Law 4th ed (2005) Labour 
Law Publications, 201 
  The 
recognition of the need to make use of substantive equality, and the societal goal which it 
16  Basson et al Essential Labour Law 202. 
17  Minister of Finance v Van Heerden (2004) 12 BLLR 1181 (CC). 
18  Du Toit, Bosch, Woolfrey, Godfrey, Cooper, Giles, Bosch and Rossouw Labour Relations Law: A 
Comprehensive Guide 5th ed (2006). 
19  Minister of Finance v Van Heerden (2004) 12 BLLR 1181 (CC). 
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aims to achieve, was reaffirmed and concretized in the Constitutional Court case of Hugo,20
 
 
the court held as follows; ‘we need to develop a concept of unfair discrimination which 
recognises that although a society which affords each human being equal treatment on the 
basis of equal worth … we cannot achieve that goal by insisting upon identical treatment in 
all circumstances before that goal is achieved’. 
2.3 IMPLEMENTING THE RIGHT TO EQUALITY AND ESTABLISHING 
UNFAIR DISCRIMINATION 
 
‘If you differentiate between things or you differentiate one thing from another, you 
recognise or show the difference between them.  A quality or feature that differentiates 
one thing from another makes the two things different, [while] discrimination is the 
practice of treating one person or group of people less fairly or less well than other people 
or groups.  It is the ability to recognise and understand the differences between two 
things.’21
 
 
As was mentioned above, the constitution does not prohibit differentiation, and does in fact 
envisage circumstances where people, or groups of people, may be treated differently, or 
discriminated against.  This is in line with the substantive equality approach and has been 
confirmed by the Constitutional Court in a number of cases as being justifiable in order to 
meet important societal goals.  The purpose of this part of the Chapter is to determine the 
difference between mere differentiation, and differentiation that amounts to unfair 
discrimination, with special reference to ‘age’.   
 
2.3.1 LISTED AND UNLISTED GROUNDS 
2.3.1.1 LISTED GROUND 
 
The first step in this enquiry is to determine whether the ground on which differentiation is 
alleged amounts to discrimination, and this is done by finding out as to whether the ground is 
listed or not.  But listed where?   ‘Section 6(1) [EEA], section 187(1)(f) of the LRA, and of 
course section 9(3) of the Constitution all contain a list of the specific grounds on which 
unfair discrimination is prohibited, wherein ‘age’ is included as one of the grounds.  The list 
is not exhaustive and the word ‘including’ in its preamble indicates that the specified grounds 
are not conclusive of scope of the prohibition.  The labour courts have recognised claims for 
discrimination on what have been termed ‘unspecified grounds’ which will be discussed once 
                                                 
20  President of the Republic of South Africa v Hugo (1997) SA 1 (CC). 
21  Collins Cobuild English Dictionary (1995). 
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the test for discrimination and its unfairness are set out below.  However, whether or not a 
ground on which discrimination is alleged is specified in the abovementioned sections, has 
important implications for the onus of proof.’22
 
  Section 187(1)(f) of the LRA, in terms of 
which dismissals for discriminatory reasons are automatically unfair, contains similar grounds 
to the ones listed in section 6(1) of the EEA, but unlike the EEA, section 187(2)(b) of the 
LRA contains a rider clause which allows dismissals based on unfair discrimination where the 
inherent requirements of the job, or age require such dismissals.  Most discrimination cases 
concern the listed grounds.  As soon as a complainant is able to show that the ground of 
discrimination is a listed ground he may then have recourse to section 9(5) of the 
Constitution, which creates a presumption of unfairness in this regard.   
Thus, if the ground upon which the complainant is alleging differentiation is a listed ground, 
there is a presumption created that the differentiation amounts to unfair discrimination and 
this presumption will remain in force until such time as it is rebutted.  This has the effect of 
creating a reverse onus of proof, which goes against the generally accepted rule in law that 
‘he who alleges must prove’.  Accordingly, one should then consider that ‘[d]iscrimination on 
the basis of [age] is presumed to amount to unfair discrimination until the contrary is proved.  
The onus shifts away from the constitutional applicant, who would, had the differentiation not 
been made on a listed ground, have had to establish that such differentiation amounts to 
unfair discrimination.  This means that it then falls on the constitutional respondent … to 
‘justify’ their respective age policy.  This is significant because, in the absence of this reversal 
of onus, it would always be up to the constitutional applicant to establish that the 
differentiation amounted to unfair discrimination’.23  However, an interesting decision was 
reach in Pretoria City Council v Walker24
                                                 
22  Van Niekerk, Christianson, McGregor, Smit and Van Eck Law @ Work (2008) 129. 
 with regards to the onus of proving discrimination, 
and the court held that ‘it is not necessary to prove an intention to discriminate.  [In] requiring 
proof of intention would be too onerous on an applicant [or constitutional respondent], 
especially in cases of indirect discrimination’.  The conclusion that one can draw from this is 
that once it is established that the alleged ground of discrimination appears either in section 
6(1) of the EEA, section 187(1)(f) of the LRA or section 9(3) of the Constitution, read with 
section 9(5) of the Constitution, the discrimination is unfair, or at least is presumed to be so 
until the contrary is proved, the onus of which lies with the constitutional respondent. 
23  Hopkins Age Discrimination, 25. 
24  Pretoria City Council v Walker 1998 (2) SA 363 (CC). 
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2.3.1.2 UNLISTED GROUND 
 
If an alleged ground of discrimination does not appear in any of the abovementioned lists, it is 
an unlisted ground.  This, however, does not mean that the allegation of discrimination is void 
of any enforcement, it merely means that unfairness is not presumed and therefore there is no 
reverse onus, and the constitutional applicant would have to establish that the differentiation 
amounts to discrimination that is unfair.  A test was laid down in the Constitutional Court 
case of Harksen v Lane25
 
 in order to assist the court, and potential applicant, to establish 
whether or not the differentiation amounted to unfair discrimination.  To date this test has 
received wide spread endorsement, and has been adopted by the Labour Courts and forms the 
basis of any enquiry into unfair discrimination in the workplace, especially where the 
allegation is on an unlisted ground.  The stages have been described as follows: 
(a) Does the provision differentiate between people or categories of people?  If not the 
enquiry ends there, however if it does, 
 
(b) does the differentiation amount to unfair discrimination?  This requires a two stage 
analysis: 
 
(i) Firstly, does the differentiation amount to ‘discrimination’?  If it is on a specified 
ground, the discrimination will have been established.  If it is not on a specified 
ground, then whether or not there is discrimination will depend upon whether, 
objectively speaking, the  ground is based on attributes and characteristics which 
have the potential to impair the fundamental human dignity of  persons as human 
beings or to affect them adversely in a comparably serious manner. 
 
(ii) If the differentiation amounts to ‘discrimination’, does it amount to unfair 
discrimination?  If it has been found to have been on a specified ground, then 
unfairness will be presumed.  If it is on an unspecified ground, unfairness will 
have to be established by the complainant.  The test of unfairness focuses 
primarily on the impact of the discrimination on the complainant and others in his 
                                                 
25  Harksen v Lane NO 1998 (1) SA 300 (CC). 
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or her situation.  If, at the end of this stage of the enquiry, the differentiation is 
found not to be unfair, then there will be no violation of section 9(3) and (4). 
 
(c) If the discrimination is found to be unfair then a determination will have to be made as 
to whether the provision can be justified under the limitation clause. 
 
In the first stage of this enquiry the question posed is whether people are being differentiated 
against, whatever the reason may be, regardless of whether the ground is listed or not, for 
example, physical characteristics or personal characteristics.  If there is no differentiation then 
the enquiry comes to an end, as it stands to reason that if there is no differential treatment 
then there can be no discrimination.  However, if differentiation exists then the next step is to 
enquire into the ground on which the differentiation is alleged and whether it is listed or not.  
If it is listed there is an automatic presumption of unfairness, which in turn places a burden of 
proof on the constitutional respondent to justify the allegation.  If the ground is not listed, the 
complainant would have to show that the ground is unfairly discriminatory or otherwise that 
it offends his dignity to such an extent that it could not be accepted by the community’s boni 
mores.  Thus the crucial question under this exercise is to find out when an alleged 
discrimination can be justified, and on what basis will such justification be applied in society? 
 
It has already been stated above that in determining the ‘fairness’ of implementing the one 
overriding factor that seems to be considered is the impact that it will have on the society as a 
whole, and whether that impact is proportionate to the object that it seeks to achieve, 
compared with the potential harm that its implementation will cause.  This question must of 
course also be answered with reference to section 36 of the Constitution26
 
 (limitation clause), 
which reads as follows: 
‘Section 36, Limitation of rights. 
(1)  The rights in the Bill of Rights may be limited only in terms of law of general 
application to the extent that the limitation is reasonable and justifiable in an open 
and democratic society based on human dignity, equality and freedom, taking into 
account all relevant factors, including – 
 
(a) the nature of the right; 
(b) the importance of the purpose of the limitation;  
(c)  the nature and extent of the limitation;  
(d) the relation between the limitation and its purpose; and  
                                                 
26  The Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, Act 108 of 1996. 
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(e) less restrictive means to achieve the purpose. 
 
(2) Except as provided in subsection (1) or in any other provision of the Constitution, 
no law may limit any right entrenched in the Bill of Rights.’ 
 
Stojce v University of KZN (Natal)27 is a good example of a case that dealt with both specified 
and unspecified grounds.  The applicant (a Bulgarian) applied for a post as lecturer in the 
university's engineering faculty.  When his application was unsuccessful, he approached the 
Labour Court on the basis that he had been unfairly discriminated against on the specified 
grounds of race and language, and the unspecified grounds of qualifications, tertiary teaching 
and research experience.  With regard to the ground of race, the applicant alleged that the 
interviewing committee was not white, that the respondents employed more Africans than 
whites and that they preferred candidates of African origin.  However, the court was satisfied 
on the evidence that the committee's preferred candidate was a white male and that there was 
no basis for the allegation that the respondents had discriminated against the applicant on the 
basis of race.28
 
 
2.4 STATUTORY PROHIBITIONS ON UNFAIR DISCRIMINATION BASED ON 
AGE 
 
2.4.1 THE EMPLOYMENT EQUITY ACT  
 
The principal statutory protection against discrimination in the workplace is established by 
the Employment Equity Act (EEA)29
 
, and section 2 thereof reads as follows: 
‘The purpose of this Act is to achieve equity in the work place by promoting equal 
opportunity and fair treatment in employment through the elimination of unfair 
discrimination …’30
 
 
This provision is extended to all employers, regardless of the type of business or size thereof, 
and places a positive duty on them to ‘take steps to promote equal opportunity in the 
workplace by eliminating unfair discrimination in any employment policy or practice’.31
                                                 
27  [2007] 3 BLLR 246 (LC). 
  
Section 6 of the EEA contains a generally expressed obligation to promote equality by 
eliminating unfair discrimination in the workplace, and a prohibition of unfair discrimination 
28  Van Niekerk, Christianson, McGregor, Smit and Van Eck Law @ Work 131 and 132. 
29  Employment Equity Act, 55 of 1998 
30  S 2 EEA. 
31  S 5 EEA. 
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on specified grounds, of which age is one, and other grounds.  Section 6(2) only contains two 
specific defences against discrimination claims.  The section provides as follows:  
 
‘Section 6: 
 
1. No person may unfairly discriminate, directly or indirectly against an employee, in 
any employment policy or practice, on one or more grounds, including race, gender, 
sex, pregnancy, marital status, family responsibility, ethnic or social origin, colour, 
sexual orientation, age, disability, religion, HIV status, conscience, belief, political 
opinion, culture, language and birth. 
 
2. It is not unfair discrimination to  
 
 (a) take affirmative action measures consistent with the purpose of this Act; or 
 (b) distinguish, exclude or prefer any person on the basis of an inherent 
requirement of the job.’ 
 
Both the abovementioned defences are permitted by ILO Convention 11132
 
 of 1958, which 
states that the following forms of differential treatment shall not be deemed to be 
discrimination: 
i. Distinctions, exclusions or preferences based on the ‘inherent requirements’ of a 
particular job [art 1(2)]; 
 
ii. ‘measures affecting an individual who is justifiably suspected of, or engaged in, 
activities prejudicial to the security of the State’ [art 4]; and  
 
iii. ‘special measures designed to meet the particular requirements of persons who, for 
reasons such as sex, age, disablement, family responsibilities or social or cultural status, 
are generally recognised to require special protection or assistance’ [art 5(2)].’33
 
 
Du Toit34
                                                 
32  International Labour Organization Convention 111 of 1958. 
 argues that the EEA must be interpreted in compliance with ILO Convention 111.  
This requires that the term ‘unfair discrimination’ in section 6 of the Act means no more than 
‘discrimination’ as defined by the Convention.  In effect, since the Convention does not 
acknowledge ‘fairness’ as a qualifier to ‘discrimination’, this interpretation denies a general 
33  Du Toit et al Labour Relations Law: A Comprehensive Guide 599. 
34 ‘The Evolution of the Concept of ‘Unfair Discrimination’ in South African Labour Law’ (2006) 27 ILJ 
1311 at 1340. 
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‘fairness’-based defence to a claim of discrimination but concedes though that the term 
‘unfair discrimination’ has a ‘venerable pedigree’. 
 
Thus, what is clear from the above provisions is that unfair discrimination has found disfavor, 
not only within South Africa, but is also at an international level.  The EEA only provides for 
two defences to allegations of unfair discrimination, whereas the ILO Convention 111 sets 
out a number of further defences.  However, what is apparent form point iii above is that, 
although age is included as a justification against unfair discrimination, it is not used in the 
same light as the justification contained in section 187(2)(b) of the LRA.35
 
  In terms of the 
ILO, it seeks to protect the person or employee from being discriminated against, while on the 
other hand, as will be discussed below, section 187(2)(b) in the LRA seeks to protect the 
employer against claims of unfair discrimination based on age, but only if an employee has 
reached the ‘agreed’ or ‘normal’ retirement age.   A further comparative view is discussed in 
Chapter 4 herein. 
2.4.2 THE LABOUR RELATIONS ACT 66 OF 1995 (LRA) 
 
One should consider that the purpose of the EEA is to promote and ensure equality in the 
workplace, while the purpose of the LRA, inter alia, is to promote effective labour relations, 
as well as the advancement of labour peace.  Section 1 of the LRA reads as follows: 
 
“[the advancement of] economic development, social justice, labour peace and the 
democratization of the workplace by fulfilling the primary objects of this Act, which are- 
 
(a) To give effect to and regulate the fundamental rights conferred by section 27 of the 
Constitution; 
 
(b) To give effect to obligations incurred by the Republic as a member state of the 
International Organization; 
…’36
 
 
Therefore, in the application of the two Acts one should consider there purpose and context, 
and perhaps consider further that the one seeks to eradicate unfair treatment, the other seeks 
to effectively manage labour relations.  Moreover, in deciding whether to use the one or the 
other reference must be had to section 9(4) of the Constitution says that ‘National legislation 
                                                 
35  Labour Relations Act 66 of 1995. 
36  Ibid. 
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must be enacted to prevent or prohibit unfair discrimination’.  Read together with section 3 of 
the LRA, which says that in applying this Act it must be done so in compliance with the 
Constitution, it is clear that this particular piece of legislation was enacted to function as the 
primary source of labour law, which must be applied in the absence of another piece of 
legislation which specifically deals with the issues as contained ion the LRA.  Furthermore 
section 210 of the LRA reads as follows: 
 
‘If any conflict, relating to the matters dealt with in this Act, arises between this Act and 
the provisions of any other law save the Constitution or any Act expressly amending this 
Act, the provisions of this Act will prevail.’  
 
Now that it has been established that the LRA will be applied, rather than the EEA when 
dealing with issues of dismissal and unfair discrimination, let us determine what is said by the 
Act in this regard.   
 
Section 187(1) of the LRA provides that: 
 
‘(1) A dismissal is automatically unfair if the employer, in dismissing the employee, 
acts contrary to section 5 or, if the reason for dismissal is; 
 
 (f) That the employer unfairly discriminated against an employee, directly or 
indirectly, on any arbitrary ground, including, but not limited to, race, 
gender, sex, ethnic or social origin, colour, sexual orientation, age, disability, 
religion, conscience, belief, political opinion, culture, language, marital 
status or family responsibility.’  
 
The effect of this provision is that if a person is unfairly discriminated, and subsequently 
dismissed, on the basis of their age it will amount to an automatically unfair dismissal.  
‘When considering whether there has been an automatically unfair dismissal on the basis of 
age, it must first be established whether the reason for the dismissal was indeed the 
employees’ age.’37  Therefore in selecting, excluding or differentiating between employees by 
reason of their age will be automatically unfair, and if an employee is dismissed as a result 
thereof, the dismissal will also be automatically unfair.  In POPCRU38
                                                 
37  Basson et al Essential Labour Law 106. 
 it was said that a 
‘refusal to appoint a person solely on the unsubstantiated assumption that the person is too old 
or too young would constitute a clear case of direct age discrimination’.  Furthermore, 
38  POPCRU obo Baadjies v SA Police Service (2003) 24 ILJ 254 (CCMA). 
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Labuschagne39
 
 states that ‘a blanket policy laying down age restrictions, without reference to 
employees’ ability to do the work in question, will likewise be open to challenge’.   
What Labuschagne is alluding to when he speaks of the ‘blanket policy’ when referring to the 
ability of employees is the danger of over and under inclusivity in using age as a determining 
factor when dismissing.  This point is well illustrated by Hopkins where he says that ‘in the 
South African context the societal goal is rather to examine factors such as the sociological 
issues surrounding unemployment or perhaps even the economic issues surrounding the task 
of employing new people.  If the objectives are not reasonably capable of being achieved then 
they are arbitrary and the danger of arbitrariness, if the age restriction is rigidly upheld, will 
result in a situation of over-inclusivity and under-inclusivity. In the context of employment 
this is easy to understand:  Mandatory retirement laws may force certain individuals out of 
jobs who are still capable of performing competently or even superbly. 
 
Moreover, those same laws may have no effect at all on younger employees who have already 
declined in both mental and physical reliability’.40
 
  He goes further and states ‘if an age 
restriction is placed on [job] applicants, because of ordinary attributes usually given to people 
who fall within that age group, then age alone should not be the overriding consideration 
where applicants who fall outside the age group nevertheless meet the criteria consistent with 
the purpose behind that restriction’.  
However, the enquiry does not end there, and indeed if one were to read further in the LRA 
you would see that section 187(1) is not without immunity, and as with most, if not all rights, 
is not absolute.  Section 187(2)(b) contains a justification where unfair discrimination is 
alleged and reads as follows: 
 
‘(2) Despite ss 1(f)- 
 
(a) a dismissal may be fair if the reason for the dismissal is based on the inherent 
requirements of the job;  
 
(b) a dismissal based on age is fair if the employee has reached the normal or agreed 
retirement age for persons employed in that capacity.’41
                                                 
39  Compulsory retirement and discrimination on the grounds of age“ by JMT Labuschagne, JC Bekker & 
BPS von Eck in „Comparative and International Law Journal of South Africa”  37, 2004, p. 41 
   
40  Hopkins Age Discrimination 26 and 27. 
41  Labour Relations Act 66 of 1995. 
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The effect that this provision has on employment law, and more particularly dismissal law 
where unfair discrimination is alleged, is that if an employer dismisses an employee who has 
reached the normal or agreed retirement age, on the grounds of age, the dismissal will be fair.  
As far as the LRA is concerned, barring the proviso relating to the inherent requirements of 
the job, this is the only justification for discriminating against an employee on the grounds 
listed in section 187(1)(f), and to a degree upholding the requirements as set out in section 
9(3) of the Constitution, Convention 111 of the ILO and section 6(1) of the EEA. 
 
Bosch42
 
 reaffirms this position and opines that ‘in order to be able to rely on section 
187(2)(b) an employer must be able to show that a dismissal was ‘based on age’, and not 
some other reason.  If the reason for the dismissal was not the employee’s age but some other 
reason the fairness of the dismissal must be treated against the requirements of section 188 or, 
where relevant, section 187.  It is not clear, however, whether age must be the sole reason, or 
simply one of the reasons for the dismissal’.  It is respectfully submitted that in order for an 
employer to escape a charge of a dismissal based on section 187(1)(f), he must justify his 
decision by way of section 187(2)(b) only, whereas to do otherwise would be stretching the 
ambit and purpose of section 187(2)(b).    
It goes without saying that where an employer attempts to disguise an automatically unfair 
dismissal with a justification of age, while the true reason for the dismissal is perhaps 
disability, the court must engage into an enquiry as to the authentic rational behind the 
dismissal.  This approach was followed in Ackerman,43 the following was said in this regard; 
‘the employers advertisement called for an ‘energetic person’ – on the basis of his age the 
employees fixed term contract was not extended when he applied for the position.  The 
arbitrator held that it was incumbent on the employer to prove that discrimination based on 
age was justified by reference to a genuine occupational requirement (inherent requirement of 
the job).  The employer also had to prove that age was a valid predictor of ‘energy’.  As the 
employer was unable to prove this, the arbitrator found that the employer had discriminated 
against the employee based an age’.  In Gqibitole v Pace Community College44
                                                 
42  Bosch ‘Section 187(2)(b) and the Dismissal of Older Workers - Is the LRA Nuanced Enough?’ 1286. 
 the Labour 
Court held that it was automatically unfair to dismiss an employee based on age before she 
43  Ackerman v United Cricket Board of SA (2004) 25 ILJ 353 (CCMA). 
44  Gqibitole v Pace Community College (1999) 20 ILJ 1270 (LC). 
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attained an agreed retirement age.  This is a perfect case in point of the fact that the courts are 
only prepared to accept unfair age discrimination where it is in compliance with section 
187(2)(b). 
 
The application of section 187(2)(b), although recognised by the courts as fair, is not without 
its complexities, and has been the topic of debate in a number of cases wherein each part of 
the provision has been dissected and been assigned meaning and context .  Some of the main 
questions to which I allude to are best answered with reference to decided case law and will 
be discussed in greater detail in the chapters to follow hereunder.  However, for now it is 
suffices to mention the main points of contention: 
 
1. Is it fair to dismiss an employee upon reaching the agreed or normal retirement age for 
persons employed in that particular capacity, with no further question as to the 
requirements set out in section 188 of the LRA, ie the substantive and procedural 
requirements?   
 
2. What is the proper interpretation of ‘normal retirement age’ for persons employed in a 
particular capacity?   
 
3. When can it be said that there is an ‘agreed’ retirement age? 
 
4. If an employee reaches this age, and subsequently is not dismissed and continues to 
work thereafter, what is the position in dismissing such an employee then? 
 
These issues will be canvassed further below. 
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CHAPTER 3 
AGE DISCRIMINATION AND UNFAIR DISMISSAL 
 
3.1 WHAT IS A DISMISSAL? 
 
‘The common law offers an employee virtually no protection against unfair dismissal, the 
reason for dismissal was not relevant, the employer was not required to give the 
employee a reason for the termination and there was no real requirement that the 
dismissal must be fair.  The common law focuses on the lawfulness of the contract of the 
employment contract by the employer.’45
 
 
The termination of an employment contract is not synonymous with the statutory concept of 
dismissal.  Only an employee is protected against unfair dismissal, as a consequence it will be 
important to first find out who is an employee, and then establish the existence of a dismissal.  
An employee is defined in section 213 of the LRA as ‘any person, excluding an independent 
contractor, who works for another person or for the State and who receives, or is entitled to 
receive, any remuneration; and any other persons who in any manner assists in carrying on or 
conducting the business of an employer’.  The same definition has been included in the 
BCEA,46 the EEA and the SDA.47
 
  If the fact of a dismissal is disputed, the employer bears 
the onus to prove the existence of a dismissal.  The definition of dismissal contained in 
section 186(1) of the LRA contains a number of elements; the section is set out below: 
‘Section 186. Meaning of dismissal and unfair labour practice (1) ‘Dismissal’ means 
that – 
 
(a) An employer has terminated a contract of employment with or without notice; 
 
(b) An employee reasonably expected the employer to renew a fixed term contract of 
employment on the same or similar terms but the employer offered to renew it on 
less favourable terms, or did not renew it; 
 
(c) An employer refused to allow an employee to resume work after she – 
 
(i) took maternity leave in terms of any law, collective agreement of her 
contract of employment; or  
 
(ii)  ... 
[Sub-para, (ii) deleted by s. 95 (4) of Act 75 of 1997.] 
 
                                                 
45  Basson et al Essential Labour Law 75. 
46  Basic Conditions of Employment Act 75 of 1997. 
47  Skills Development Act 97 of 1998. 
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(d) an employer who dismissed a number of employees for the same or similar reasons 
has offered to re-employ one or more of them but has refused to re-employ another; 
or(e) an employee terminated a contract of employment with or without notice 
because the employer made continued employment intolerable for the employee; 
 
(f) an employee terminated a contract of employment with or without notice because 
the new employer, after a transfer in terms of section 197 or section 197A, provided 
the employee with conditions or circumstances at work that are substantially less 
favourable to the employee than those provided .by the old employer’.48
 
 
This section illustrates that the Act has envisaged that dismissal means more than the simple 
‘you are fired’ conception, and even includes circumstances where an employee terminates 
the employment contract, but has in fact been dismissed in terms of the LRA.  However, if an 
employee succeeds in establishing the existence of a dismissal, it means nothing more to the 
effect that the employee has been ‘dismissed’ under the LRA, and the existence of a dismissal 
does not necessarily mean that the dismissal is unfair.  In the case of dismissals that are not 
automatically unfair, it generally remains for the employer to establish that the dismissal was 
effected for a fair reason, after following a fair procedure.  A dismissal must therefore be both 
substantively and procedurally fair in order to escape a finding of an unfair dismissal.49
 
  To 
this effect section 188 of the LRA says that: 
‘(1)  A dismissal that is not automatically unfair, is unfair if the employer fails to prove 
– 
 
(a) that the reason for dismissal is a fair reason – 
 
(i)  related to the employee's conduct or capacity; or  
(ii)  based on the employer’s operational requirements; and 
 
(b) that the dismissal was effected in accordance with a fair procedure. 
 
(2) Any person considering whether or not the reason for dismissal is a fair reason or 
whether or not the dismissal was effected in accordance with a fair procedure must 
take into account any relevant code of good practice issued in terms of this Act.’ 
 
Moreover, we have already seen in section 187 of the LRA that in some instances a dismissal 
will be deemed to be automatically unfair, unless the dismissal is effected for the reasons set 
out in section 187(2).   
 
                                                 
48  Labour Relations Act 66 of 1995. 
49  Van Niekerk, Christianson, McGregor and Smit Law @ Work 206. 
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3.2 DISMISSALS BASED ON AN EMPLOYEES ‘NORMAL OR AGREED’ 
RETIREMENT AGE 
 
‘In the context of section 187(2)(b), a question which is raised is, whether a dismissal of 
an employee who has reached the normal or agreed retirement age is infact a dismissed 
when the contract of employment is terminated.   
 
The Labour Court has fairly consistently adopted the view that when an employee reaches 
the normal or agreed retirement age, the contract of employment expires automatically, 
and a termination of employment in these circumstances does not constitute a dismissal as 
defined in the LRA’ 
 
In a case brought before the CCMA, NDCAWU on Behalf of Jiyane and BARKER & 
NELSON (Pty) Ltd,50
 
 the issue was discussed, if a termination of employment due to 
retirement (section 187(2)(b)) constitutes a dismissal in terms of section 186 LRA.  In this 
case the applicant had reached his stipulated retirement age of 65 and was offered retirement 
by his employer, as well as being paid a retirement package.  His union, on his behalf, 
claimed that the termination of his employment on retirement was covered by the definition 
of dismissal in section 186 of the LRA, and by not informing the employee in advance of his 
approaching retirement the employer is said to have been failed to follow a fair procedure. In 
addition, the union argued that since retirement was covered by section 186 LRA, the 
employer did not follow the procedural aspect in implementing the applicant’s retirement.  In 
detail, the retirement is seen as an unfair dismissal due to the lack of following the procedure.  
The Arbitrator held that section 186 of the LRA, in its wording/ definition does not include 
any form of retirement and therefore the onus is on the Union to show that Mr Jiyane was 
dismissed.    
In Schmahmann v Concept Communications Natal (Pty) Ltd51
 
 the applicant was employed as 
a bookkeeper until age 64.  The employer intended switching to a computerized accounting 
system and, in light of that and the employee's age, informed her that she was being retired.  It 
was common cause that the employer had no fixed retirement date and the applicant had 
intended to carry on working while she remained in good health and capable of doing her job.  
The court was of the view that: 
‘When an employer and employee agree specifically or by implication (retirement on 
normal retirement age) in advance that the effluxion of time is to operate as the guillotine 
                                                 
50  (2005) 26 ILJ 2491 (BCA). 
51  (1997) 18 ILJ 1333 (LC). 
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which severs their employment relationship then it cannot be said that when this date 
arrives that there has been a dismissal by the employer although the relationship and the 
contractual obligations are terminated.’ 
 
The court found that Ms Schmahmann could not claim to have been dismissed because her 
contract had been terminated by the effluxion of time.  I would point out, however, that the 
'guillotine' of time, can only operate in the manner envisaged by the court where the 
retirement age is agreed, ie set by the parties and is specific.  If not, one cannot speak of there 
being a fixed term contract between the parties. It is naturally important to be able to 
distinguish between an ‘agreed’ and a ‘normal’ retirement age for an employee working in a 
particular capacity.  The court did not dwell on that distinction, but it is an issue which will be 
addressed in detail below.52
 
 
In support of this decision the court in Rubenstein v Prices Daelite (Pty) Ltd,53 said that a 
dismissal based on an employee reaching the ‘normal or agreed’ retirement age is not unfair.  
Another example of where the Labour Court has held in favour of the above position is to be 
found in Gqibitole v Pace Community College.54
 
  In this case the employee, Ms Gqibitole, 
claimed that she had been dismissed, and that the dismissal was automatically unfair based on 
age.  In perusing the facts of the case the court came to the conclusion that the agreed 
retirement date was set at 1 March 2000, but that the applicant was dismissed on 30 June 
1998.  The agreed retirement age was contained in a retirement policy which the respondent 
had actually helped the applicant in 1994.  Moreover, the court discovered that there was no 
‘normal’ retirement age for employees employed in the applicant’s capacity, seeing as though 
there were other teachers employed with the respondent who taught well beyond the age of 
60, and even into their early 70’s.  In the closing stages of the judgment, Basson J made the 
following assessment;  
‘I find that the applicant’s dismissal by the respondent took effect on 30 June 1998.  
Second, I find that the employer unfairly discriminated against the applicant directly on 
the basis of age in so dismissing the applicant.  I make this finding because the dismissal 
based on age is not fair as the employee has not reached the normal retirement age for 
persons employed in that capacity (there being no such barrier) and also she did not reach 
the agreed retirement age as at 1 March 2000.” 
 
                                                 
52  Bosch ‘Section 187(2)(b) and the Dismissal of Older Workers - Is the LRA Nuanced Enough?’ 1285. 
53  (2002) 23 ILJ 528 (LC). 
54  (1999) 20 ILJ 1270 (LC). 
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Thus, as far as the question as to whether or not dismissing an employee, or otherwise put 
ending the employment relationship, upon reaching an agreed or normal retirement age is 
concerned, it seems as though the courts have stayed hard to the finding that such a state of 
affairs does not amount to a dismissal as defined in section 188 of the LRA, and where an 
employer does dismiss an employee before reaching the agreed or normal retirement age, 
once such an age is determined, it will be regarded as an automatically unfair dismissal based 
on age (section 187(1)(f)).   
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CHAPTER 4 
AN INTERNATIONAL AND COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVE 
 
4.1 THE ILO AND ITS APPLICATION ON DISMISSALS UPON REACHING THE 
‘NORMAL OR AGREED’ RETIREMENT AGE 
 
4.1.1 INTRODUCTION 
 
Section 39 of the Constitution says that in interpreting the Rights contained in the Bill of 
Rights, of which the right to fair labour practices is contained, every court, tribunal, or forum 
must consider international law, and may consider foreign law.  Moreover, section 9(4) 
thereof says that national legislation must be enacted to prevent or prohibit unfair 
discrimination.  An inference that may be drawn in reading these two provisions together is 
that when giving effect to the provisions in the Constitution by enacting national legislation, 
the drafters of such legislation must have recourse to international laws, and must merely 
consider foreign law.  Although this might be a fair interpretation of the relevant provisions it 
stands to reason that national legislation cannot be amended every time a new piece of 
international law is assented to, and as such it is a better inference that international law act as 
more of a source of law, used to ‘fill the gaps’ so to speak, when our own laws do not provide 
for, or silent on a particular topic.  What is more, at section 1(b) of the LRA it is states that 
one of the purposes of the Act is to give effect to the obligations incurred by the Republic as a 
member state of the International Labour Organization, and at section 3(c) there is a 
compulsion on anyone interpreting the LRA to do so in compliance with the public 
international law obligations of the Republic. 
 
The new government (post 1994) had to commit itself to upholding international labour 
standards and undertook to submit certain ILO Conventions to Parliament for ratification, this 
came after a fact finding mission55
                                                 
55  Fact-Finding and Conciliation Commission (FFCC). 
 was sent to South Africa to asses the compliance of our 
Labour Laws against those standards that the ILO sought to achieve.  The FFCC found a 
number of shortfalls in the previous LRA and made certain recommendations in order to 
remedy some of the defects.  It must however be made mention that although the previous 
LRA did not meet all of the ILO’s standards when they came to South Africa in 1992, our 
legal framework and labour dispensation was vastly improved form previous years.  This was 
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primarily due to the recommendations of the Weihan Commission, which all but reformed the 
labour laws of post apartheid South Africa.  Since 26 May 1994 South Africa has been a 
member state of the ILO, and has subsequently ratified most of the ILO’s core conventions, 
of which include the ‘Discrimination (Employment and Occupation) Convention, 1958 (No 
111)’.  Conventions such as this one are given effect, firstly, through ratification, and 
secondly, through implementation which is done by incorporating its provisions into national 
legislation, an example of such a piece of legislation is the current LRA. ‘The ILO’s 
Discrimination (Employment and Occupation) Convention 111 informs member states that 
there are only three justifications for conduct that would otherwise be viewed as 
discriminatory, ie the inherent requirements of the job, state security and affirmative 
action.’56
 
 
A third example of how international law is incorporated into local law is when courts decide 
to look for guidance in the relevant conventions and recommendations, if one were to look at, 
for example, NUMSA v Bader Bop (Pty) Ltd.57
 
  In this case the court, faced with an appeal 
from the Labour Appeal Court, had to determine on the application of the restrictive 
interpretation given to one of the provisions in the LRA.  The court had the following to say 
‘[T]he proper approach to interpreting the LRA was to interpret it in accordance with 
international law and set aside the Labour Appeal Courts decision.’   
 
4.1.2 ILO PROVISIONS ON DISMISSAL FOR AGE UPON REACHING THE 
‘NORMAL OR AGREED’ RETIREMENT AGE 
 
The ILO Convention 158 regulates the termination of employment at the initiative of the 
employer.  The convention was adopted in 1982, and while no the most widely ratified 
convention; it has had a profound effect on South African law.  First, the Industrial Court 
drew heavily on the convention during the 1980’s when it developed protection against unfair 
dismissal under the unfair labour practice definition.  Secondly, much of the wording of 
Chapter VIII of the LRA draws on the convention.  Thirdly, the courts have referred to the 
convention in interpreting and applying the statutory protection against unfair dismissal.58
 
 
                                                 
56  Bosch ‘Section 187(2)(b) and the Dismissal of Older Workers - Is the LRA Nuanced Enough?’ 1298. 
57  [2003] 2 BLLR 103 (CC). 
58  Van Niekerk, Christianson, McGregor, Smit and Van Eck Law @ Work 205. 
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Nonetheless, on a further reading of the provisions of the ILO in general, and looking at other 
conventions that South Africa have ratified, it seems as though there is a two staged 
consideration in the justification of termination of an employment contract on the basis that 
an employee has reached the ‘normal or agreed’ retirement age, said with reference to the 
ILO’s Termination of Employment Recommendation 166 of 1982.  The above 
recommendation states that ‘age should not constitute a valid reason for termination of 
employment, but states that this is subject to national law and practice regarding 
retirement’.59
 
  It is thus clear that although termination of employment on grounds of age is 
not allowed, there is room for such a termination where national law and practices are in 
place when the issue of retirement is placed in the picture.   
The ILO’s Older Workers Recommendation 162 of 1980 provides as follows: 
 
‘21. Wherever possible, measures should be taken with a view to – 
 
(a) ensuring that, in a framework allowing for a gradual transition from working 
life to freedom of activity, retirement is voluntary;  
 
(b) making the age qualifying for an old-age pension flexible.  
 
22.  Legislative and other provisions making mandatory the termination of employment 
at a specified age should be examined in the light of the preceding Paragraph and 
Paragraph 3 of this Recommendation.’60
 
 
To summarise the above provisions, the following is submitted: as a deciding factor age 
should not constitute a valid reason to terminate an employment relationship, and goes 
against the idea of fairness, and is clearly discriminatory on at least one of the grounds listed 
in various statutes, conventions and recommendations.  However, the ILO also recognises 
that such discrimination is not all inclusive and without exception, it allows for national 
legislation to justify such treatment when it comes to the issue of retirement, which has been 
done in section 187(2)(b).  The ILO further recognises that although retirement should be 
voluntary, making age a qualifying provision when dealing with mandatory retirement age 
should be seen in a local context as within a particular area, and does not foresee that such 
action is all together prohibited.   
 
                                                 
59  Bosch ‘Section 187(2)(b) and the Dismissal of Older Workers - Is the LRA Nuanced Enough?’ 1293. 
60  Ibid. 
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4.2 FOREIGN LAW ON MANDATORY RETIREMENT AGES 
 
The purpose of this part of the chapter is to briefly set out what has been determined on this 
issue in selected other countries, merely as a comparative point of departure. 
 
BRITAIN 
 
When conducting an enquiry on age discrimination, a crucial principle is that limitations on 
basic rights must be narrowly construed; that is, interpreted in such a way that the basic right 
in question (in this case age discrimination) is limited as little as possible.  In Britain, all 
direct discrimination is unlawful unless it is covered by one of the specific legislative 
exceptions, while the statutory exceptions as derogations from the fundamental principle of 
equal treatment must be interpreted restrictively.61
 
 
In addition, section 109 of the United Kingdom’s Employment Rights Act of 1996 precludes 
employees from claiming to have been unfairly dismissed when they attain the normal retire-
ment age and in any other case the age of 65.62  Moreover, ‘in the United Kingdom, the 
Employment Equality (Age) Regulations 2006 came into force on 1 October 2006.  In terms 
of these regulations, employees will be able to ask to work beyond the compulsory retirement 
age.  The employer will have to consider reasonably such requests.  Under the new 
regulations there will no longer be an upper age limit for claiming unfair dismissal.63
 
 
AUSTRALIA 
 
There are also a number of statutes in Australia which prohibit discrimination on the basis of 
age but permit employers to force employees to retire once they have reached the employer’s 
mandatory retirement age.  The Commonwealth, of Australia’s Workplace Relations Act 1996 
makes termination of employment based on age unlawful, but provides that compulsory 
retirement may be lawful if based on the inherent requirements of the job.  Certain employees 
are excluded from the Act and Commonwealth public servants are still subject to the 
mandatory retirement age set out in the Public Service Act 1922. 
                                                 
61  Du Toit et al Labour Relations Law: A comprehensive Guide 597. 
62  Bosch ‘Section 187(2)(b) and the Dismissal of Older Workers - Is the LRA Nuanced Enough?’ 1294. 
63  Wagner ‘Age Discrimination - A Note on Schweitzer v Waco Distributors’ (2006) 27 ILJ 2031. 
 27 
 
NEW ZEALAND 
 
In New Zealand it is forbidden to require an employee to retire at a certain age where the 
person is qualified for the job unless 'being of a particular age or in a particular age group is a 
genuine occupational qualification for that position or employment, whether for reasons of 
safety or for any other reason. 
 
NEW SOUTH WALES 
 
Section 49ZV of the New South Wales Anti-Discrimination Act 1977 makes it unlawful tor an 
employer to 
 
(a) retire an employee from employment, 
(b) to require an employee to retire from employment, 
(c) to threaten to retire an employee from employment or 
(d) engage in conduct with a view to causing an employee to retire from employment on the 
ground of the employee’s age.64
 
 
SPAIN 
 
In Spain there has been a recent Supreme Court ruling prohibiting the imposition of a 
mandatory retirement age and it is no longer possible for government or collective bargaining 
to lay down age limits. In Spain, retirement is a right and not an obligation. 
 
ITALY 
 
In Italy, legislation that precluded pensioners from working has now been abolished.  
Industrialized western society has come to realise that age in itself is no impediment to 
productivity.  The age barrier is being deconstructed and theoretical constructions are being 
developed to replace the crude dichotomy of work and retirement. 
 
                                                 
64  Bosch ‘Section 187(2)(b) and the Dismissal of Older Workers - Is the LRA Nuanced Enough?’ 1295. 
 28 
USA 
 
The United States abolished compulsory retirement in 1986 by way of the Age Discrimination 
in Employment Act.  The Council of the European Union issued a directive in 2000 to lay 
down a general framework for combating discrimination.65
 
 
CANADA 
 
In Stoffman v Vancouver General, the Supreme Court of Canada held that it was permissible 
for a specialist research hospital to set a mandatory retirement age in order to ensure that it 
remained abreast of new discoveries and ideas and to ensure the influx of younger doctors 
who, by virtue of their recent training, were fully conversant with the latest theories, 
discoveries and techniques.  This would, in the court’s view, go some way to guaranteeing 
that the hospital would meet its objective of excellence in the pursuit of its mandate as a 
centre of medical research and teaching and the major acute care hospital in the province.  
Similarly, in McKinney v University of Guelph and Dickason v University of Alberta the court 
upheld mandatory retirement ages aimed at enhancing a university’s capacity to seek and 
maintain excellence by permitting flexibility in resource allocation and faculty renewal and 
preserving a university’s academic freedom and the collegial form of association by 
minimizing distinctive modes of performance evaluation.66
 
 
OTHER 
 
The International Plan of Action on Ageing emanated from the United Nations sponsored 
Second World Assembly on Ageing in Madrid in 2002.  There, participating countries 
(including South Africa) endorsed the principle that older workers should be allowed to work 
as long as they want to and are able to do so productively.  In addition, a new approach 
should be adopted to retirement ‘that takes account of the needs of the employees as well as 
the employers, in particular by applying the principle of flexible retirement policies and 
practices while maintaining acquired pension rights’.67
                                                 
65  Ibid. 
 
66  Ibid. 
67  Bosch ‘Section 187(2)(b) and the Dismissal of Older Workers - Is the LRA Nuanced Enough?’ 1294. 
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CHAPTER 5 
PRECEDENTS AND CASE LAW 
 
In the discussion to follow the most authorative cases on the topic of mandatory retirement 
ages will be looked at, and although many might have already been mentioned in preceding 
chapters the key focus here will be to investigate the current position in South African law on 
this topic, as well as to answer some of the questions asked at the end of 2.2.3 above.  Is it fair 
to dismiss an employee upon reaching the agreed or normal retirement age for persons 
employed in that particular capacity (refer to 3.2 above), with no further question as to the 
requirements set out in section 188 of the LRA, i.e. the substantive and procedural 
requirements?  What is the proper interpretation of ‘normal retirement age’ for persons 
employed in a particular capacity?  When can it be said that there is an ‘agreed’ retirement 
age?  If an employee reaches this age, and subsequently is not dismissed and continues to 
work thereafter, what is the position in dismissing such an employee then? 
 
5.1 SCHMAHMANN v CONCEPT COMMUNICATIONS NATAL (PTY) LTD (1997) 18 
ILJ 1333 (LC) 
 
In this case the applicant employee had been employed by the respondent company for 15 
years as a bookkeeper/office manageress.  Although the company had no set retirement age, it 
notified the employee that her services would be terminated to coincide with its changeover 
to a computerized system of bookkeeping, and that she would be retired at the age of 65 
years.  On a challenge to the Labour Court Ms Schmahmann alleged that there was a 
dismissal, and that it was automatically unfair on the basis of age.   This was due to the fact 
that the employer had not agreed on a retirement age with the applicant, and that, on the 
evidence of an expert witness, there was no normal retirement age for persons employed in 
the capacity as the applicant.  However, in its finding the court held that, in terms of the 
definition of a dismissal in section 186 of the LRA, there had been no dismissal, and as a 
consequence thereof the applicant could not claim to have been dismissed.  The court was 
therefore of the opinion that an employee is not dismissed if that person is retired by his or 
her employer on attaining the agreed or normal age of retirement.  The court, having 
concluded that there was no dismissal and that there was no onus on the company to prove the 
fairness thereof, granted absolution from the instance.  The court held further that, when an 
employer and an employee agree specifically or by implication (retirement on normal 
 30 
retirement age) in advance that the effluxion of time is to operate as the guillotine which 
severs their employment relationship, then it cannot be said that when this date arrives there 
has been a dismissal by the employer although the relationship and the contractual obligations 
are terminated.  The effect of this ruling is that when an employer envisages terminating an 
employment contract on the grounds set out in section 187(2)(b), he may do so with no 
further question as to procedural or substantive fairness. 
 
According to Bosch,68
 
 ‘there was no agreement on retirement age and it could thus not be 
said that [the applicants] contract had been terminated by any means other than the 
employer’s action in bringing it to an end.  She was thus ‘dismissed’ and entitled to claim that 
such dismissal was unfair’.  Bosch goes on to say that ‘the court in Schmahmann should not, 
it is respectfully submitted, have been so quick to find that once a retirement date had been 
attained, there was no ‘dismissal’ within the meaning of the LRA’. 
5.2 SCHWEITZER v WACO DISTRIBUTORS (A DIVISION OF VOLTEX (PTY) LTD) 
(1998) 19 ILJ 1573 (LC) 
 
In this case the applicant’s employment was terminated when he was 67 years old, the agreed 
retirement age being 65.  The termination was not based on any complaints regarding his 
work performance or conduct and the court found that he had not been afforded a fair hearing 
before the decision was taken to terminate his services.  The applicant took his case to the 
Labour Court claiming that his dismissal was automatically unfair in terms of section 
187(1)(f).69
                                                 
68  Bosch ‘Section 187(2)(b) and the Dismissal of Older Workers - Is the LRA Nuanced Enough?’ 1285. 
  As a result, the main question in this case was whether it is required to afford an 
employee sufficient opportunity to make representations before he is dismissed, so as to bring 
it in line with the requirement of procedural fairness, after he has reached the ‘normal or 
agreed’ retirement age.  As we have already seen in Schmahmann, there are no requirements 
of fairness in retiring an employee on reaching the ‘normal or agreed’ retirement age, but now 
the question remains, what if that employee is not dismissed on reaching such an age and is 
allowed to carry on working past that age, is he then allowed the opportunity of fairness?  In 
this case Zondo J found that there is no such requirement.  On the plain wording of section 
187(2)(b), it was held, the dismissal of an employee who has passed the normal age of 
retirement ‘is fair’, thus leaving the court no scope to pursue the inquiry any further.  It could 
be argued that, since section 187(2)(b) limits the constitutional right to fair labour practices 
69  Ibid. 
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and equal treatment, it must be interpreted restrictively.  This would suggest that, if an 
employee works past the agreed or normal retirement age, the usual rules relating to dismissal 
should apply,70 and was confirmed in the decision of SACTWU v Rubin Sportswear71 where it 
was held that ‘it was automatically unfair to force the applicants to retire without proper 
consultation.72
 
 
However, in Rubenstein v Prices Daelite (Pty) Ltd73 it was confirmed that the employer did 
not waive the right to dismiss by allowing the employee to work beyond the normal 
retirement age.74
 
  The result of the aforementioned is that even if an employee is allowed to 
work beyond the agreed or normal retirement age, upon the arrival of an employers desire 
dismiss, and in the absence of a fixed term contract (not equated to the meaning of fixed term 
contracts in Schmahmann), he may simply serve the employee with a notice of dismissal, or 
termed better, retirement. 
5.3 JOHANE v RAND MINE MILLING & MINING (1995) 16 ILJ 1249 (IC) 
 
Section 187(2)(b) says that it is fair to dismiss an employee once they have reached the 
normal or agreed retirement age.  Thus the question that needs to be answered is what 
constitutes a normal retirement age, and what amounts to an agreed retirement age.   
 
5.3.1 AGREED RETIREMENT AGE 
 
What constitutes an agreement for the purpose of this provision?  It stands to reason that if the 
employer and employee have a written contract of employment, and in that contract there is a 
clause which stipulates that the employee agrees to retire at 65, then there is an agreement to 
that effect.  If this is the case and the employee subsequently reaches that age, the employer 
may then retire the employee with no further discussion on the matter, regardless of whether 
the employee feels that such action is unfair or not (see Shmahmann v Concept 
Communications Natal (Pty) Ltd (1997) 18 ILJ 1333 (LC) in this regard).  ‘The [next] 
question [which] arises [is] whether there is an agreed retirement age for the purposes of 
                                                 
70  (2002) 23 ILJ 528 (LC). 
71  (2003) 24 ILJ 249 (LC). 
72  Basson et al Essential Labour Law 107. 
73  Botha v Du Toit and Partners [2006] 1 BLLR 1 (LC) held that an employer who allows an employee to 
work beyond the normal retirement age must follow a fair procedure before terminating employment.  
74  Du Toit et al Labour Relations Law: A Comprehensive Guide 394. 
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section 187(2)(b) where there is no retirement age specified in the employee’s contract of 
employment, but there is one contained in the rules of relevant pension and/or provident 
funds.  In Johane v Rand Mine Milling & Mining the court found that there was no agreed 
retirement age where, during the employee’s employment, the employer introduced pension 
and provident funds specifying a retirement age of 60 and the employee refused to join those 
funds.  It might, of course, be posited that the court would have found that there was an 
agreed retirement age if the employee was a member of the relevant funds.  The ages set out 
in the documents regulating such funds could therefore be taken to mean that the employee 
must retire from the fund when she reaches a certain age, but need not necessarily retire from 
the employers employ’.75  This approach found favour in Bratko v Beloit Walmsley Ltd.76  In 
SACTWU v Rubin Sportswear77
 
 it was held that if a provident fund defined ‘retirement age’, 
meant nothing more than the employee is now entitled to that benefit, not that the employee 
must now resign from their office.  There has however been a suggestion that should such a 
pension or provident fund document be incorporated into the employees contract of 
employment by reference, it will become part of the contract and will thereby have 
established an agreed retirement age.   
5.3.2 NORMAL RETIREMENT AGE 
 
The word ‘normal’ is synonymous with other words such as usual, regular, ordinary, typical 
and customary.  This would imply that when one speaks of the ‘normal’ retirement age, they 
are referring to the age at which people normally, usually or ordinarily retire at.  There is also 
that part of the section that says ‘for persons employed in that capacity’, and suggests that 
when referring to the normal retirement age of persons employed in that capacity, it is up the 
courts to decide, with whatever available evidence there is relating to different practices 
among the different kinds of jobs, to determine the age at which people in a particular 
position normally would retire.  This is simply based on a logical examination of the wording 
of section 187(2)(b) and has no legal basis. 
 
                                                 
75  Bosch ‘Section 187(2)(b) and the Dismissal of Older Workers - Is the LRA Nuanced Enough?’ 1289 and 
1290. 
76  [1996] ICR 76 (EAT). 
77  (2003) 24 ILJ 249 (LC). 
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However, according to Bosch78 the following is said in this regard; the word ‘normal’ in the 
context of ‘normal retirement age’ might be taken to mean ‘usual’.  In SACTWU v Rubin 
Sportswear79
 
the court appeared to accept that a normal retirement age could be established by 
way of evidence as to the employer’s general practice in retiring employees.  The existence of 
a normal retirement age within a particular organization might thus depend on the employer 
being consistent in ‘retiring’ its employees.  [T]he court should have regard to a variety of 
factors and consider at what age an employee in a particular case can be reasonably expected 
to be compelled to retire.  This is an objective test and the determination would depend on the 
relevant facts of the particular case. 
As Wagener80 points out: ‘the concept of unfair dismissal is a creation of the Act and is not 
part of the common law of contract’.  If an employee has reached his ‘normal’ retirement age 
and is dismissed on the basis of his age, he is blocked on both sides: if the employer is made 
to go at the time of arrival of his ‘agreed’ or ‘normal’ retirement age it does not constitute 
dismissal, if he decides to go anytime thereafter, section 187(2)(b) of the LRA deems 
dismissal fair.81
 
 
5.4 DATT v GUNNEBO INDUSTRIES (PTY) LTD [2009] JOL 23236 (LC) 
 
In the case of Datt v Gunnebo Industries (Pty) Ltd82
                                                 
78  Bosch ‘Section 187(2)(b) and the Dismissal of Older Workers - Is the LRA Nuanced Enough?’ 1289, 
1290 and 1291. 
 the applicant continued to be employed 
by the respondent’s company after he had reached the normal retirement age of 65. He had 
signed a revised employment contract and acknowledged the terms of the company’s 
provident fund, binding himself thereto. Unless agreed otherwise by both parties, the normal 
retirement age would be 65.  Despite this fact, and after the applicant was granted an 
extension of employment later than his retirement age, he was sent into retirement without a 
mutually agreed termination of his employment.  The applicant and the respondent signed in 
writing a new agreement next to the existing employment contract which records that,  
‘notwithstanding that the employee had reached the normal retirement age of 65, he will 
remain in employment until such time as the parties mutually agree that he should retire’.  
Steenkamp J stated that in this case, the employer cannot rely on section 187(2)(b) LRA as a 
79  (2003) 24 ILJ 249 (LC). 
80  Wagner ‘Age Discrimination - A Note on Schweitzer v Waco Distributors’ 2031. 
81  Ibid. 
82  [2009] JOL 23236 (LC). 
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justification to unilaterally terminate the applicant’s employment based on age.  Although an 
employer should always be able to dismiss an employee in circumstances like this, where the 
parties had agreed to an amended retirement age, the provision must still be a fair reason and 
the employer must follow the fair procedural rules of dismissal.  Age being the reason does 
not constitute a fair dismissal.  This case repeats other cases, heavily relying in its finding in 
the process of consultation and agreements between the employer and the employee.  
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CHAPTER 6 
ARGUMENT FOR AND AGAINST MANDATORY RETIREMENT 
AGES 
 
6.1 ARGUMENTS FOR AND AGAINST MANDATORY RETIREMENT AGES 
GENERALLY 
 
One of the main arguments in favour of section 187(2)(b) is that serves to create employment, 
as well as certainty in the workplace.  By allowing a steady exit of senior employees, it 
encourages more junior employees to seek to fill those positions and ‘move up the ladder’ so 
to speak.  Take the example where in a specific company where the normal or agreed 
retirement age is 65, it can be expected that when the senior employees bordering on that age 
reach such an age that they will retire and make room for their junior counterparts.  This, it is 
argued, not only creates employment, but also creates certainty in the workplace that at 65 the 
employee will leave and make room for someone else.  Another argument in favor of 
allowing the older workers to leave and creating an influx of new and younger employees is 
that they bring fresh ideas, new energy and are up to date with the latest developments, 
whereas their older counterparts are seen to be deteriorating in physical and mental ability.  
On this topic Bosch83
 
 has the following to say: 
‘Older workers are seen as having deteriorating physical and mental abilities.  They are 
viewed as less receptive to new technology and more resistant to change in the 
organization of the employer’s enterprise.  In addition older workers are seen as lacking 
necessary skills and being difficult to retrain as well as lacking the drive, energy and 
ambition of younger workers.’ 
 
It is further argued on this point that it might be reasonable ‘that older workers bear the 
burden of unemployment more heavily than younger workers.  They should leave the labour 
market to open up positions for younger work seekers.  This seems unobjectionable if one 
takes into account that older workers may have been contributing to pension or provident 
funds throughout their working lives and will thus be financially secure once they are 
retired’.84
 
 
                                                 
83  Bosch ‘Section 187(2)(b) and the Dismissal of Older Workers - Is the LRA Nuanced Enough?’ 1299 and 
1300. 
84  Ibid. 
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On the other hand it can be argued that the very point that we are attempting to justify 
amounts to nothing more than stereotyping, and in fact has no legal basis.  All it does do, 
which is by now obviously clear, is that it treats older people differently than younger people.  
What must be kept in mind in this regard is that as oppose to race or sex, every person will at 
some point get old.  However, as has already been noted above, there are ways to justify such 
discrimination on non-legal grounds, for example, the societal goals of a community, or 
correcting past injustices, and discrimination of the elderly should only be regarded as fair if 
it is warranted by compelling public interest.  It doesn’t seem that any of these have been 
applied when considering mandatory retirement ages, but, as is illustrated above, there have 
been attempts to justify such action in terms of industrial needs and general assumptions 
about the elderly.  Bosch85
 
 points out the following with regard to points against a mandatory 
age, and it seems that for every point for its retention, there is an equally justified point for its 
elimination: ‘Many of the abovementioned points are nothing more than common stereotypes 
of older workers.  Ageing is an individualized process.  It affects each of us differently.  It 
cannot therefore be assumed that ageing will affect all workers similarly, causing the same 
degree of decline in their physical and mental abilities, no matter how administratively 
convenient such assumptions might be.  What older workers might lack in physical ability 
they make up for in seniority and experience.  While mandatory retirement might open up 
positions in an organization, it does not create new jobs.  Unemployment is predominantly 
determined by industrial restructuring, technological change and economic trends, not by the 
lack of movement of workers through businesses.  Institutional planning is also not 
necessarily assisted by mandatory retirement ages in that other factors such as deaths, 
resignations and early retirement are predictable with relative certainty with reference to 
statistical forecasts.’   
By taking an international view, industrialized Western society has come to result, that age by 
itself does not create a barrier to productivity.  Moreover, the age barrier is being 
deconstructed and theoretical constructions are being developed to replace the crude 
dichotomy of work and retirement.86  Wagener argues further on that ‘the intention of the 
legislation can never have been to deprive employees who are able to, and who wish to 
continue to work after passing their retirement age’,87
                                                 
85  Ibid. 
 the opportunity to do so.  
86  Walker Age and Employment paper, www.cas.flinders.edu.au/iag/proceedings/proc0033.htm. 
87  Wagner ‘Age Discrimination - A Note on Schweitzer v Waco Distributors’ 2031. 
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6.2 ARGUMENTS FOR AND AGAINST MANDATORY RETIREMENT AGES IN 
A SOUTH AFRICAN CONTEXT 
 
In South Africa there is a particular problem with mandatory retirement ages, and it goes 
further than a mere differentiation issue. 
 
‘South Africa has experienced declining fertility rates for some years, contributing to the 
declining population growth.  This decline is being hastened by the HIV/ Aids pandemic, 
which seems to be contributing to the ‘natural’ decline in fertility rates and raising the 
death rates.  The overall result is that, from 2008 onwards, negative growth is expected in 
the size of both the total population and the labour force …  The implication of the age 
structure of Aids deaths implies the evolution of a demographic pyramid, similar to that 
of a developed country, lower fertility rates will lead to a lower percentage of children 
and higher proportion of elderly people, compared with the current demographic 
pyramid.’88
 
 
With this in mind it seems almost suicidal on an industrial level to want to push out the older 
work force.  A huge age gap is developing in the employment sector, and by removing the 
more experienced and more knowledgeable workers we leave gaps in the employment market 
to the effect that the younger workers have no senior employees to learn from and obtain 
valuable knowledge from the seasoned players.  ‘The projected impact of AIDS on the South 
African workforce is frightening.  According to ILO statistics South Africa stands to loose 
32.6% of its workforce to the disease by 2020.  The age groups most affected by HIV/ AIDS 
are those between 20 and 49.  If older workers are less likely to be infected with and die from 
AIDS we should surely not be encouraging them to leave the workforce.  Bosch concludes by 
saying that ‘the proper approach would seem to be taking steps to retain their services rather 
than endorsing measures that encourage their departure from employment’.89
 
 
Another factor to consider are the concerns raised that section 187(2)(b) of the LRA is 
unconstitutional, not only on the grounds of age discrimination, but also in line with the 
requirements of the equality clause, the following note makes reference to the above: 
 
‘It has been suggested, consistent with development in other jurisdictions, that imposing a 
retirement age at all is an act of discrimination on the grounds of age.  The South African 
courts have not yet considered this argument.  However, section 187(2) provides that a 
dismissal based on age is fair if the person has reached the normal or agreed retirement 
age.  Unless there were to be an application of a Constitutional attack on the LRA and its 
                                                 
88  See ABSA Long Term Prospects for South African Economy 2002-2016 (2002) 4. 
89  Bosch ‘Section 187(2)(b) and the Dismissal of Older Workers - Is the LRA Nuanced Enough?’ 1302. 
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regulation of the right to equality based on age, this formulation would appear to leave 
limited scope for an argument that the notion of a retirement age is in itself 
discriminatory.’90
 
   
It is submitted that the precise scope of section 187(2)(b) awaits further clarification, 
particularly in view of the important socio-economic factors bearing on the question of the 
continued employment of older employees.91
                                                 
90  Van Niekerk et al Law @ Work 231. 
 
91  Bosch et al Labour Relations Law: A Comprehensive Guide 394. 
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CHAPTER 7 
CONCLUSION 
 
If one thing is clear it is that the LRA, which has been drafted to give effect to the 
Constitutional requirements of fair labour practices and equality, is aimed at providing a basis 
whereby South Africa’s labour legislation can be tested against the international requirements 
of the ILO, and to give effect to the obligations placed on South Africa as a member State 
thereof.  It must also be reads with other pieces of legislation to prevent unfair discrimination 
in the workplace. 
 
Section 187(1)(f) seeks to do this by making it automatically unfair to dismiss an employee 
on any of the grounds contained therein, which are also contained in the Constitution and the 
Employment Equity Act.  However, section 187(2)(b) allows for an employer to discriminate 
against an employee where the inherent requirements of the job require same, or where the 
employee has reached the normal or agreed retirement age of persons employed in that 
capacity.  It is this provision which has resulted in this and many other notes on the topic of 
age discrimination, or more particularly, mandatory retirement ages. 
 
Section 187(2)(b) is a provision that has caused some difficulty for the courts in determining 
its proper interpretation.  As is apparent from the discussion above, there is still scope for 
debate around exactly what the wording means.’92
                                                 
92  Bosch ‘Section 187(2)(b) and the Dismissal of Older Workers - Is the LRA Nuanced Enough?’ 1303. 
  In the preceding discussion it has been 
shown that when an employer and employee decide, or agree to end the employment 
relationship at a specified date, that being the date upon which an employee reaches a certain 
age, the employment relationship may be severed with no further enquiry into the fairness of 
the dismissal.  If, however, there is no agreement as to this age it has been held that such an 
age can be determined with reference to a number of factors, inter alia, but not limited to, any 
provident or retirement fund which has been incorporated into the employees contract of 
employment.  It is nevertheless up to the courts to draw form the available evidence and 
makes a finding in this regard.  What is more, the courts have held that even if an employee is 
allowed to work beyond the agreed or normal retirement age, it does not remove the 
employers right to dismiss the employee on the grounds in section 187(2)(b).  Bosch sums up 
this approach as follows: 
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‘Where an employee has been dismissed upon or after attaining the agreed or normal 
retirement age for an employee employed in that capacity, it has been held that section 
187(2)(b) operates to preclude employees from challenging the fairness of that dismissal.  
Section 187(2)(b) also appears to limit the right to equality.  It is a justification for 
dismissals that might otherwise be considered unfairly discriminatory on the grounds of 
an employee’s age.  While there might be sound policy arguments for permitting 
mandatory retirement ages, that must be done in light of the constitutional guarantee of 
equality and fair labour practices.’93
 
   
Discrimination against the elderly however, remains the rule rather than the exception.94  
There are though a number of reasons for continuing discrimination:95
 
 
• Compared to racial and gender discrimination, ageism is not regarded as a serious issue. 
 
• There are still no fixed criterions for identifying an elderly person. 
 
• Younger people need to be protected while elderly people are regarded as dispensable. 
 
• The legislation assumes that it is justified for being in basic retirement on life 
expectancies that prevailed when persons and social benefits for the elderly were 
introduced: 
 
1. In terms of section 45(1) of the South African Police Service Act 68 of 1995 a 
member of the Police Force may retire from the service and must be retired, on the 
date of attainment of the age of sixty years. 
 
2. Similar provisions are made for the retirement of correctional service officials96 
and comparable rules are embodies in sections 45, 84 and 86 of the Defence Act.97
 
 
                                                 
93  Ibid. 
94  Labuschagne, Bekker and Von Eck ‘Compulsory Retirement and Discrimination on the Grounds of Age’ 
(2004) Comparative and International Law Journal of South Africa  44. 
95  See entire list at: Labuschagne, Bekker and Von Eck ‘Compulsory Retirement and Discrimination on the 
Grounds of Age’ 44-45. 
96  S 12 of the Correctional Services Act 8 of 1959. 
97   44 of 1957. 
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These laws confirm the outdated assumption that sixty five is the outer limit of human 
usefulness.  It is submitted that the government employees’ pension schemes and the state’s 
social security system will not be able to bear the financial burden indefinitely.98
 
 
As mentioned above, discrimination of the elderly should only be regarded as fair if 
compelling public interest warrants it. Discrimination should be directed at the abilities and 
functionality of an individual and not of an age group.99
 
  Summing up the latter case 
highlights, the importance of setting retirement age in both the contracts of employment and 
also in the rules of the retirement fund becomes clear. 
Employees who reach the normal or agreed retirement age should not simply be allowed to 
continue in employment on an open-ended or loose basis. In many situations, an employee 
who has reached this age can no longer be a member of the retirement fund and this should 
trigger a formal change in the employment relationship.  The employee should formally retire 
and enter into a fresh contract, which contains provisions which clearly set out fixed date of 
termination.  This can be extended later on by agreement which should specify that no 
precedent or reasonable expectation of further renewal is thereby created. 
 
                                                 
98  Labuschagne, Bekker and Von Eck ‘Compulsory Retirement and Discrimination on the Grounds of Age’ 
46. 
99  Labuschagne, Bekker and Von Eck ‘Compulsory Retirement and Discrimination on the Grounds of Age’ 
61. 
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